INTRODUCTION* 1. In recent years, weapons technology has leapt forward. Weapons can be delivered with unprecedented precision; surveillance and reconnaissance systems can provide remarkably detailed information about hostile force structures and locations; and a combination of data analysis and distribution systems can allow this information to be rapidly exploited. Most military analysts now agree that advances in military technology require a fundamental reappraisal and revision of operational concepts to ensure that full advantage is taken of them.

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This combination of technological advances and revisions in operational concepts represents a revolution in military affairs. THE CONCEPT OF A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 3. According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: 'A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.' Such revolutions have occurred many times in history for a variety of reasons. The most obvious cause is technological 'push'.

The invention of gunpowder, the steam engine, the submarine, the internal combustion engine, the aeroplane, the aircraft carrier, and the atom bomb are some of the most obvious innovations which led to fundamental changes in the conduct of warfare. Some of these technological changes had origins in the civilian world while other revolutions in military affairs were brought about by 'social-military revolutions' such as the development of railways, which enabled military forces to be moved and supplied over great distances. There is a debate about what exactly constitutes a 'revolution in military affairs'. Some analysts maintain that there have been only three and that these have been linked to the nature of the societies: agrarian, industrial, and information. Others have identified as many as fourteen. There is agreement, however, that technology alone is insufficient to bring about a true revolution in military affairs.

For example, almost five centuries elapsed between the invention of gunpowder and its large-scale employment on the battlefield; and in the early stages of the Second World War, Germany's innovative operational concept that using communications technologies to integrate land and air forces enabled it to defeat French and British forces equipped with very similar technology. In other words, an appropriate operational concept is just as important as technological invention in bringing about a revolution in military affairs.

THE GULF WAR 6. The Gulf War in early 1991 gave an indication of some of the key components of the current revolution in military affairs. The Gulf War saw the military use of information technology at its zenith.

New technologies enhanced Coalition forces' ability to exchange and use information, and highlighted the imperative of denying the adversary the ability to communicate with his forces. But the most obvious capability was that of precision strike. New guidance technologies have led to the development of munitions that can be delivered with remarkable precision. These include munitions delivered by aircraft, cruise missiles, and artillery.

What is often forgotten is the impact that such munitions have on logistics and operations. The ability to destroy certain targets using one or two precision-guided munitions instead of by large-scale bombing cuts the logistic 'tail' dramatically. For instance, during the Gulf War, 6,250 tons of precision-guided munitions were used compared with 81,980 tons of 'dumb' bombs. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the precision-guided munitions (PGMs) hit their targets compared with about 25 per cent of dumb bombs. As well as yielding logistic benefits, precision-guided munitions enabled the Coalition forces to minimise collateral damage.

It should also be noted that the use of systems such as stealth aircraft and cruise missiles enabled certain attacks to take place against highly defended targets virtually without warning. Equally important but less obvious was the role played by sophisticated surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering systems.

These included proven land, air and space systems as well as some prototypes that were pressed into service. Systems included the E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications; the RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft; the prototype Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), as well as a wide variety of photo-reconnaissance aircraft. Extensive use was also made of space assets, both military and commercial, belonging to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. These provided the Coalition forces with communication, navigation, surveillance, intelligence, and early warning. Using some 60 satellites, Coalition forces had secure strategic and tactical communications enabling time-sensitive information to be exchanged between ground, naval, and air units spread throughout the theatre.